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Abstract 
 
The cohesion policy of the European Union has become its primary instrument promoting 
development in the peripheral member states. The enduring consequences of the 2007-08 crisis 
and the economic governance agenda requiring fiscal discipline from the member states have 
raised the policy’s significance further. However, similar economic inequalities characterize the 
EU nowadays as several decades ago. The cohesion policy is by no means alone responsible for 
this, but the reasons for its ambiguous performance deserve further scrutiny. Empirical studies 
explain variation in fund performance with domestic institutional quality and absorption capacity, 
but the member states’ fund spending strategies have not been addressed so far. This is puzzling 
because they are important determinants of the economic effects of EU funds. The paper fills this 
gap by investigating the spending strategies of the Southern and the Eastern members in two 
recent programming cycles (2007-13 and 2014-20). Assessed on five expenditure categories, the 
paper reveals that physical infrastructure investments enjoyed priority over long-term growth-
generating R&D and human capital projects and that the allocation of EU funds did not reflect 
domestic development needs.  
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1 
Introduction 
 
The European Union’s cohesion policy aims at reducing regional disparities and enhancing 
competitiveness and economic growth in the less developed member states. Through this policy 
the EU provides generous transfers for those members that are lagging behind the most advanced 
countries. Over the decades, the Southern periphery (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal) 
has received the greatest support, but the focus has shifted to the Eastern members since the 2004 
enlargement. 
 
Both of the peripheries suffered from the 2007-08 global financial and economic crises that gave 
a severe blow to their development. Facing multiple domestic problems such as economic 
decline, rising unemployment rates, budget deficit and debt, the cohesion policy gained an even 
greater significance for these states than before. By accelerating the spending of the funds, the 
EU tried to turn the cohesion policy into a tool that served as a buffer against economic downturn 
(Jacoby 2014). In spite of these efforts, the catch-up of the Southern periphery – except for 
Ireland – has been sluggish while the East is still lagging far behind the European core. 
Moreover, internal regional disparities have persisted both in the South and the East which 
suggests that the policy has failed to meet its stated goals. 
 
Failing the declared targets gives rise to several potential explanations. On the one hand, the 
funds may have been insufficient to leave any visible impact on these economies. On the other 
hand, they might have been spent inefficiently or on underperforming projects. Another potential 
explanation for the lack of convergence between the EU core and periphery may be that the 
allocation of funds did not correspond to the development needs of the member states. To put it 
differently, it may be the case that the funds were spent on projects that were less likely to serve 
long-term economic catch-up. This calls for an inquiry into the spending strategies of the 
peripheral member states. 
 
Although the European Union sets strict criteria on how the funds should be allocated to various 
expenditure categories, central governments still enjoy considerable freedom in choosing their 
spending priorities. The governments determine the final proportion of the EU funds across 
different objectives. Fund allocation within a member state thus reveals domestic spending 
preferences. The question is whether those preferences reflect domestic development needs or 
not. 
 
The paper seeks to explore this issue by investigating the allocation of EU funds in the South and 
in the East in the previous (2007-13) and in the current programming period (2014-20) according 
to five spending categories (physical infrastructure, human capital, R&D and information 
technology, business support, and institution building) that constitute the backbone of the 
cohesion policy. These five dimensions represent those key areas along which the EU assesses 
the development needs of the member states. The paper shows that the EU’s financial assistance 
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has mostly been allocated for infrastructural investments, whereas funds dedicated to research 
and development and human capital projects – which are more likely to generate long-term 
economic growth – received less priority. The paper also reveals that the member states’ 
spending strategies did not entirely follow their domestic development needs. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, it introduces the cohesion policy as a key developmental 
instrument for integrating the EU’s peripheries with the core and formulates the research 
questions. Next, the paper highlights an empirical gap in the cohesion policy literature. Past 
research focused on the policy’s consequences on domestic territorial administrative systems, its 
potential growth effects, political-institutional factors influencing its implementation, and 
determinants of fund absorption capacity. However, the spending strategies of the national 
governments set before each funding period have not been addressed so far. Before discussing the 
empirical results and their possible implications, the paper introduces the data sources and the 
applied analytical methods. The final section concludes and outlines some potential further lines 
of inquiry. 
 
Background and research questions 
The legal obligation in the Treaty of Rome (1957) to reduce economic disparities motivated the 
creation of the cohesion policy that dates back to 1975 when the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) was launched. Even though the European Social Fund and the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund had existed since 1958, the creation of the 
ERDF marks the birth of the cohesion policy (Allen 2005). Besides these financial instruments, 
which are usually referred to as the Structural Funds, another important building block of the 
policy is the Cohesion Fund (CF), which was established in 1994 to provide funding for large 
environmental and transport infrastructure projects in those member states where Gross National 
Income was below 90 percent of the EU average.
1
  
 
The integration process – especially the creation of the European single market – was expected to 
aggravate economic disparities across the EU. The launch of the cohesion policy was therefore an 
attempt to “match the territorial scale of the response with the source of the economic problems” 
(Begg 2010, 81). EU policy-makers shared the view that financial assistance to the poorer 
member states would increase their growth rates (Frisina 2008) and would raise their market 
power. This seemed crucial for those countries that were the most exposed to the costs of 
integration. Some observers did not share these views though and considered the funds merely as 
side-payments to the relatively backward members to ‘buy’ their support for further economic 
integration (Leonardi 2005). 
  
                                                          
1
 Since the 2014-2020 programming period, the funds of the EU’s cohesion policy are referred to as European 
Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF). 
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In spite of the concerned voices, the EU has provided financial and technical assistance for the 
Southern and later on for the Eastern members to facilitate their integration into the European 
market. Funds distributed through the cohesion policy represent only a single element of the 
massive transformative toolkit of the EU with which it aimed to trigger state restructuring and at 
the same time intended to build domestic institutional capacities (Bruszt and Vukov 2015). 
Although some authors argue that especially in the case of the Eastern members assistance was 
mainly about maximizing the EU’s own gains and minimizing the costs arising from enlargement 
(Jacoby 2010), both the scope and the depth of the external assistance suggests a nuanced EU 
approach with which it emerged as a unique transnational integration regime (Bruszt and 
McDermott 2014). 
 
As Bruszt and Vukov (2015) observe, the EU applied different integration strategies towards the 
Southern and the Eastern periphery. While in the case of the South the EU initiated state 
restructuring by posing a variety of incentives that were expected to produce the desired outcome 
(“getting the incentives right”), in the East it intervened more directly (through conditionality, 
regular monitoring, and provision of technical assistance) and placed the emphasis on institution-
building (“getting the institutions right”). The funds of the cohesion policy served these purposes 
as well. 
 
However, some key economic indicators which the cohesion policy was supposed to improve do 
not reflect these differentiated approaches. The Southern periphery's catch-up process has stalled, 
and its GDP per capita
2
 relative to the richest member states stands almost exactly where it was 
20 years ago. In 2016, the level of GDP per head in the South reached 78 percent of the nine most 
developed member states
3
 while in 1995 this figure was 76 percent.
4
 Although the East has 
shown signs of incremental convergence, the region is still far behind the core as its GDP per 
head stands at 66 percent of the most developed members. 
 
The lasting consequences of the 2007-2008 economic crises increased the salience of the 
cohesion policy. First, the funds served as an external source of revenue for the shrinking state 
budgets. Second, the unfolding economic governance agenda of the EU placed serious limitations 
to overspending, which meant that the cohesion policy became the primary funding source of 
domestic development projects. These events highlight the importance of the central 
governments’ spending strategies: the allocation of the EU funds to various expenditure 
categories shows the developmental priorities of the member states that may as well influence the 
funds’ long term growth effects.   
 
                                                          
2
 expressed in Purchasing Power Standards 
3
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, France, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom. Luxemburg is 
excluded from the calculation because its extraordinarily high per capita GDP would lead to a misleading picture. 
4
 Without Ireland. Source: the author's own calculation based on Eurostat data 
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The above considerations constitute the background for the questions that this paper seeks to 
explore: (1) did the Southern and the Eastern members follow similar or different spending 
strategies; (2) and were their spending priorities in line with their domestic development needs?  
 
 
Spending strategies: a gap in the literature 
 
The vast majority of scholarly works that examine the cohesion policy focus on the old EU 
member states. Those studies can be classified into four distinct but related groups. An extensive 
literature explores the consequences of the funds on the domestic territorial administrative 
systems, while another line of inquiry estimates the effect of the funds on national and regional 
growth trends and analyzes their implications for regional disparities. Contributions closely 
related to the previous group examine the determinants of country- and regional-level absorption 
capacities and their consequences for economic growth. Finally, a limited number of works 
explain the domestic patterns of fund implementation and management by considering both 
economic and political aspects. 
 
Works dedicated to the domestic institutional effects of the cohesion policy examine how the EU 
has empowered sub-national territorial units (see, for instance, Hooghe 1996; Bache and Jones 
2000; Börzel 2002; Bourne 2003; Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon 2004b; Paraskevopoulos and 
Leonardi 2004; Baun and Marek 2006; Bachtler and McMaster 2007). Authors reach 
contradictory conclusions in that some argue that the EU has facilitated regionalization 
(Scherpereel 2010), while others show that those effects remained rather limited (Bruszt 2008).  
 
Publications analyzing the effect of the funds on economic growth have also reached different 
conclusions. Some contend that the funds had an unconditional positive impact on growth (Bähr 
2008; Becker, Egger, and von Ehrlich 2010; Cappelen et al. 2003), while others estimated a 
positive impact that depended on domestic institutional conditions (Ederveen, de Groot, and 
Nahuis 2006; Mohl and Hagen 2010), whereas several studies found negative or no impact at all 
(Boldrin and Canova 2003; Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996). Even though the results differ 
substantially, those scholars that apply the most sophisticated spatial econometric estimation 
techniques agree that EU grants have a differential economic impact on growth at the national 
and the sub-national level (Le Gallo, Dall’erba, and Guillain 2011; Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés 
2012). 
 
The findings of the absorption capacity literature suggest that the negative relationship between 
economic growth and EU grants is related to the inferior institutional quality of the recipients. 
Ederveen and his co-authors (2006) showed that EU funds contributed to growth only in those 
countries that had an adequate institutional environment. This argument seems to travel to the 
sub-national level in that high levels of regional administrative capacity are associated with more 
effective fund implementation (Terracciano and Graziano 2016). Furthermore, a studyby 
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Rodriguez-Pose and Garcilazo ( 2013) has established that EU funds had a marginal positive 
effect on growth only if the institutional quality of the recipient country was high. However, 
those member states and sub-national regions which are in the greatest need for external 
assistance are usually also the ones that have inferior institutional quality. The anticipated 
positive link between the growth effects of EU funds and institutional quality therefore leads to a 
paradoxical situation that the financial transfers fail to enhance growth precisely in those areas 
which, because of their backwardness, receive the greatest support.
5
 
 
Finally, a growing literature focuses on the role of political circumstances in domestic fund 
management. Evidence from Western Europe suggests that national governments engage in vote 
seeking activities by channeling EU funds into those regions where their position is weaker 
(Bouvet and Dall’erba 2010; Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012). Similarly, Kemmerling and Bodenstein 
(2006) demonstrated that those sub-national regions received more EU grants where left-wing 
parties were stronger or where Eurosceptic parties proved more popular. However, Dellmuth 
(2011) found only mixed evidence for the vote-seeking behaviour of central governments. 
Recently, Charron (2016) has shown that both the autonomy of sub-national regions and their 
quality of regional government play a role in securing EU funds. Political manipulation with EU 
funds seems to characterize fund implementation in the Eastern member states as well (Bloom 
and Petrova 2013; Medve-Bálint 2017). 
  
The above review of the literature reveals that both the growth effects of EU funds and the 
absorption capacity of the recipients may depend on economic, institutional and political factors. 
However, none of the scholarly works have so far examined the differences and similarities in 
how the member states allocate the available funds across key spending categories prior to each 
programming period. Scholars have not accounted for the spending strategies of the member 
states.  
 
Although the European Commission sets mandatory earmarking requirements
6
 for certain 
expenditure categories, within these limitations national governments enjoy considerable freedom 
in establishing their spending priorities. Domestic preferences may differ on whether 
infrastructural investments, education and training programmes, or research and development 
projects receive more support. Cross-country variation in the proportion of EU funds allocated to 
                                                          
5
 According to the 2016 Worldwide Governance Indicators, the mean score for regulatory quality was nearly 
identical in the Southern (.89) and the Eastern periphery (.92), whereas in the most advanced EU economies (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) the average 
score was nearly twice as high (1.70). Source: the author’s own calculation based on the WGI dataset (available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home). 
6
 For instance, in the 2007-2013 programming period 60 percent of the funds spent in the eligible least developed 
regions (convergence regions) had to be spent on the so-called Lisbon objectives, while this share was 75 percent for 
funds spent in the more developed, yet eligible regions (regional competitiveness and employment objective). The 
Lisbon expenditures included investments into knowledge and innovation, energy efficiency, improving the business 
potential of small- and medium-sized enterprises and improving employability. 
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these spending categories reflects the differences in domestic priorities. Member states may 
therefore follow diverse fund spending strategies. 
 
Prioritizing a specific spending category over another has both political and economic 
significance. In political terms, national governments may use the funds to increase their 
popularity among the electorate by allocating funds for large-scale projects with high visibility, 
such as highway or railway construction. In economic terms, the anticipated developmental 
effects of the funds may also depend on the type of projects.  
 
Although investing EU funds into physical (especially transport-related) infrastructure has been 
popular in the peripheral member states, this may lead to controversial growth effects. As 
Sloboda and Yao (2008) showed, investment in physical (transportation) infrastructure does not 
positively contribute to economic growth, at least not directly. While a comprehensive review of 
the literature revealed (Straub 2008) that most of the empirical studies found a significant, 
positive relationship between infrastructure investments and growth, there are some important 
caveats. First, improving transport connections between more developed and poor regions may 
enhance agglomeration effects in that easier access to the economic centre can facilitate the flow 
of labour and capital away from the periphery to the core. This is often referred to as a backwash 
effect which may stimulate growth in the centre but is disadvantageous for the laggard areas 
(Richardson 1976). A recent study (Cosci and Mirra 2018) examining the regional growth effects 
of the north-south highway in Italy found evidence for similar processes that had an ambiguous 
impact on the economic catch-up of the lagging behind southern regions with the centre and the 
north. 
 
Second, if infrastructure investments improve transport inside poor regions, then they may 
contribute to the catch-up of areas that lag behind, but at the same time it may also slow down 
overall economic growth because the projects are realized at the expense of more developed 
areas. In a similar vein, Lakshmanan (2011) stresses that the impact of infrastructure investments 
on growth depends on a large number of intervening factors such as spatial agglomerations, 
interactions within and between economic sectors, technological change and trade patterns. 
Furthermore, Banister and Berechman (2001) argue that transport investments may contribute to 
economic growth only if an appropriate domestic economic environment meets with similarly 
favourable political and institutional conditions. 
 
In contrast, empirical studies on the consequences of investments into human capital and research 
and development show a more straightforward and less conditional relationship with economic 
growth. As suggested by endogenous growth theory, technology and knowledge is characterized 
by increasing returns (Romer 1986; Lucas 1988). This implies that improving the level of human 
capital and support for R&D activities may enhance economic growth also in the long run. 
Human capital investments have indeed been found to be positively related to long-term growth 
(Barro 2001), and they also tend to stimulate technological progress (Nelson and Phelps 1966). 
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As Griffith and her co-authors (2004) showed, the returns to R&D and human capital investments 
are higher in less developed countries than in more advanced economies. Further empirical 
findings (Bilbao-Osorio and Rodríguez-Pose 2004) suggest that a similar relationship applies in 
the case of the peripheral regions of the EU. 
 
Based on the above evidence, a member state’s fund spending strategy may substantially 
influence the economic effects of the EU grants. This is especially relevant in the post-crisis 
context in which growth-enhancing measures are more important than ever. While spending on 
physical infrastructure could potentially raise the popularity of the government, sustained positive 
developmental effects can be expected from less spectacular human capital and R&D projects. 
Moreover, a mismatch between domestic development needs and fund allocation across various 
expenditure categories may fail to realize maximum returns on the investments. The following 
sections address these issues in detail.  
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Development needs and spending categories – concepts, hypothesis and data 
 
Prior to each funding period, the European Parliament and the European Council negotiates the 
total budget of the cohesion policy for the next programming cycle. Following the approval of the 
overall budget that indicates the total amount of funds available for each member state, the 
European Commission initiates consultations with the national governments about the specific 
domestic programmes to be funded. It is at this stage when the governments have to submit a 
development plan which identifies the spending priorities and the share that each prioritized area 
would receive from the funds. It is important to note that the amount of funds set aside for each 
country is fixed for every programming period; it is not possible to spend more than it is 
stipulated in the budget.  
 
The Commission, which pays the certified expenditures and monitors project implementation, 
has to approve the national plans before member states begin spending the funds. The 
governments must determine the share of funds they intend to spend on the proposed 
programmes prior to the start of the programming period and before they receive any payments 
from the Commission.
7
 Domestic spending strategies are therefore revealed before every funding 
period and they remain fixed throughout.  
 
In this paper, a member state’s spending strategy refers to how the national development plans 
allocate the EU funds across the following categories: physical infrastructure; research, 
development and info-communication technology; human capital; business support; institution 
building. This is operationalized as the percentage share that each category takes from the total 
amount of funds allocated for the member state. 
 
This work defines domestic development needs as the relative performance of the Southern and 
Eastern member states in the above five spending categories prior to each funding period. The 
lower the performance, the greater the relative need for developing that specific area. In order to 
measure relative development needs, each spending category is associated with three indicators 
that reveal the member state’s performance before the two analyzed funding periods: 
 
Indicators for physical infrastructure (funds for transport, environment and energy-related 
investments) where higher values reveal better performance: 
 
- length of motorways per 1000 km
2
 (2006 and 2013) 
- World Bank’s quality of infrastructure index which is a composite indicator of the quality of 
trade- and transport-related infrastructure (e.g., ports, railroads, roads, information technology) 
(2007 and 2014) 
                                                          
7
 For further details on the process of planning and implementation of the cohesion policy please consult the 
European Commission’s webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/how/index_en.cfm. 
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- energy saving in final energy consumption in million tons of oil equivalent per million 
inhabitants (2006 and 2013) 
 
Indicators for human capital (funds spent on educational and training programmes) where higher 
values demonstrate better performance: 
 
- share of population (25-64 years) with tertiary education attainment (2006 and 2013) 
- share of population (25-64 years) with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
education (2006) 
- participation rate of population (18-64 years) in education and training (2006 and 2013) 
 
Indicators for research and development where higher values reflect better performance: 
 
- patent applications to the European Patent Office per million inhabitants (2006 and 2013) 
- total intramural R&D expenditure of the government sector per inhabitant (2006 and 2013) 
- total R&D personnel as a percentage of total employed (2006 and 2012) 
 
Indicators for business support (funds spent within this category mostly aim to generate jobs and 
enhance social inclusion): 
 
- activity rate of females (15-64 years) (2006 and 2013) 
- long-term unemployment in percentage of unemployment (2006 and 2013) 
- long-term unemployment in percentage of active population  (2006 and 2013) 
 
While higher female activity rates indicate greater performance, the opposite is the case with the 
indicators of long-term unemployment. 
 
Indicators for institutional quality (funds that aim to increase domestic institutional capacity) 
where higher values show better performance: 
 
- Worldwide Governance Indicators of government effectiveness, regulatory quality and control 
of corruption (2006 and 2013). 
 
For each spending category the relative development need of a member state is identified as 
follows. First, for every indicator countries are ranked on their performance. The top performer 
thus takes rank number one while the worst performer is ranked fifteenth. After the rankings have 
been assigned for every indicator they are aggregated. In this vein, the country scores in each 
spending category can range between 3 and 45 where higher values demonstrate greater relative 
development need or, in other words, inferior performance compared to the other Southern and 
Eastern member states. 
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Finally, nonparametric tests of association
8
 are calculated in order to determine the extent to 
which development needs in each spending category correspond to the proportion of funds 
allocated to them. The assumption is that the member states allocate EU funds across the main 
spending categories according to the development needs of the different domestic segments. It is 
therefore expected that a government would allocate more funds (i.e., a higher share from the 
total EU grants) to those fields where the country’s performance is comparatively low and less 
funds would be secured for those areas where the country is relatively close to the other member 
states. Thus the hypothesis is that the greater the relative development need in a specific field, the 
greater share of the funds will be allocated to that area. Hence, a positive association is expected 
between development needs and the share of funds devoted to the corresponding spending 
category. 
 
The main limitation of this approach is that national governments may not compare their 
country’s performance to others. Also, decisions on the spending priorities may not even be 
influenced by socio-economic indicators. Furthermore, it may also be the case that national 
performance is weak in each dimension thus every category could potentially become the prime 
target of the funds. Even in this case, however, the central government has to prioritize because 
the amount of EU transfers is fixed. It follows that the allocation of funds across the categories 
reflects the member states’ spending preferences. 
 
For each programming period the official EU documents apply different names to essentially the 
same expenditure categories. For instance, the European Commission grouped the committed 
expenses for 2000-06 into fourteen categories, while the documents for 2007-13 and 2014-20 
listed the financial commitments along a similar but not identical typology. Table 1 shows how 
for the purposes of this paper these various expenditure categories in the official documents were 
grouped into the five key spending categories. 
                                                          
8
 Calculating Pearson’s correlation coefficients for such a small number of observations (N = 15) would produce 
misleading results. For this reason, Kendall’s tau-b, which is a non-parametric test of association and is much more 
reliable for small samples, is applied. 
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Table 1: Classification of the different expenditure categories into the five main spending categories 
Main spending 
category 
Expenditure category in 2000-2006 Expenditure category in 2007-2013 Expenditure category in 2014-2020 
Physical 
infrastructure 
Transport infrastructure 
Energy infrastructure 
Environmental infrastructure 
Planning and rehabilitation 
Promoting the adaptation and development of 
rural areas 
Transport 
Energy 
Environmental protection and risk prevention 
Urban and rural regeneration 
Transport and energy networks 
Low carbon economy 
Climate change and risk prevention 
Environment and resource efficiency 
Research and 
development (R&D) 
and info-
communication 
technology (ICT) 
Research, technological development and 
innovation (RTDI) 
Telecommunication infrastructure and 
information society 
Research and technological development, 
innovation and entrepreneurship 
Information society 
Research and innovation 
Information and communication technology 
Business support 
Assisting large business organizations 
Assisting SMEs and the craft sector 
Increasing the adaptability of workers and 
firms, enterprises and entrepreneurs  
Improving access to employment and 
sustainability 
Culture 
Tourism 
SME competitiveness 
Employment and labour market 
Human capital 
Social inclusion 
Developing education and vocational training 
Social and public health infrastructure 
Workforce flexibility, entrepreneurial activity 
Positive labour market actions for women 
Improving the social inclusion of less-favoured 
persons 
Improving human capital 
Investment in social infrastructure 
Social inclusion 
Education and training 
Institution building 
and technical 
assistance 
Labour market policy 
Technical assistance and innovative actions 
Mobilisation for reforms in the fields of 
employment and inclusion 
Strengthening institutional capacity at national, 
regional and local level 
Technical assistance 
Efficient public administration 
Technical assistance 
  
Source: the author’s compilation based on SWECO (2008), European Commission (2007) and ESIF data website (https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/countries).
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Only eight of the eleven current Eastern European EU members
9
 participated in the 2000-06 
programming cycle because Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007 while Croatia 
entered in 2013. But funding for those eight countries was also limited to 2004-06. These 
circumstances lead to serious difficulties with comparing the Southern and the Eastern 
members’ spending strategies in 2000-06. This is the reason why the paper focuses on the 
2007-13 and the 2014-20 programming cycles when each Southern and Eastern member 
received funds during the entire period.  
 
 
Empirical results and discussion 
 
This section first identifies differences and similarities in spending strategies, then it goes on 
to analyze whether fund allocation corresponded to the domestic development needs. Figure 1 
displays the average shares
10
 of each category from the total EU financial support in the three 
programming periods. The figures reveal that spending on physical infrastructure has been 
treated as a priority in each budget cycle both in the East and in the South. At the same time, 
human capital projects and funds for business support have incrementally gained salience, 
while the share of funds on R&D and info-communication increased in 2007-13 but decreased 
in 2014-20. 
 
Figure 1 also reveals that the two country groups did not substantially differ from each other 
in terms of how the funds were prioritized across the main spending categories. The greatest 
differences appear in the share of funds allocated for physical infrastructure investments, and 
in this respect the spending preferences between the two peripheries differ the most in 2014-
20. While in 2014-20 the East spends a much greater share of the funds on physical 
infrastructure than the South (47 percent vs. 29 percent), the South places more emphasis on 
business support relative to the East (26 percent vs. 16 percent). 
Can the variation in the shares for physical infrastructure across the two country groups be 
attributed to the difference in the availability of the Cohesion Fund for the East and the 
South? As noted earlier, the Cohesion Fund exclusively finances physical infrastructure 
(transport and environment-related) projects. If it takes a high share from the total amount of 
EU funds, then it also drives up the share of funds spent on physical infrastructure. While the 
Eastern member states have received Cohesion Fund support in each programming period, in 
2000-06 Ireland was eligible only until 2004 whereas Italy was not eligible at all.
11
 In 2007-
13 neither Ireland nor Italy received transfers from this financial instrument, whereas in 2014-
20 only Greece and Portugal benefit from the Cohesion Fund. 
                                                          
9
 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
10
 The figures were calculated as the averages of the country-level shares of each spending category thus they are 
not biased by the spending strategy of those member states that received the highest amount of EU funds. 
11
 On the results of the eligibility mid-term review in accordance with Article 2 of the Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 1164/1994 establishing a Cohesion Fund. Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 24 March 
2004. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0191:FIN:EN:PDF. 
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Figure 1: Share (%) of the main spending categories from the total EU funds in the Southern and the Eastern EU member states 
 
Source: the author’s own calculation based on SWECO (2008), European Commission (2007) and ESIF data website (https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/countries). 
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Accordingly, in each budget period, the Cohesion Fund represented a larger portion of the EU 
funds in the Eastern periphery than in the South. On average, in 2000-06, 59 percent of the total 
external assistance for the East came through the Cohesion Fund whereas the share was only 23 
percent in the Southern members. A similar pattern emerged in 2007-13: the CF represented 35 
percent of the total funds allocated for the East compared to the 14 percent in the three eligible 
Southern states.
12
 In 2014-20 the average share of the Cohesion Fund from the total EU funds in 
the Eastern member states amounted to 30 percent whereas in the case of Greece and Portugal, 
the two eligible Southern countries, it reached 22 and 14 percent, respectively. 
 
Interestingly, the growing difference between the East and the South in terms of the availability 
of the Cohesion Fund is not entirely reflected in the shares allocated for physical infrastructure 
projects. On the one hand, in both country groups infrastructure investments received priority. On 
the other hand, the Southern member states have maintained preference for spending a 
considerable share of the EU resources on physical infrastructure rather than placing greater 
emphasis on the other spending categories. This is puzzling in light of the economic crisis which 
generated grave and lasting problems of unemployment in the South that would seem to call for 
measures supporting human capital projects. 
 
As for the relationship between development needs and the countries’ spending strategies, 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the nonparametric tests of bivariate association between the 
measures of development needs in each spending category and the shares of funds allocated to 
the corresponding area. The plus signs highlight a significant positive relationship; the negative 
signs show a significant negative relationship, while the zeros reveal no relationship between the 
indicators. 
 
The initial expectation was to find a positive association between the relative development needs 
and the share of funds. However, this only holds in the case of physical infrastructure and 
institution building, the two spending categories with the largest and lowest budgets, 
respectively. This suggests that more inferior domestic physical infrastructure is associated with 
greater share of EU funds spent on infrastructural investments. In a similar vein, lower 
institutional capacity is associated with higher share of funds devoted to institution building. 
However, this relationship does not apply to the other three spending categories, in spite of the 
fact that those are the areas which are most likely to produce positive development effects in the 
long run and are the most needed in the post-crisis context. What is more, fund allocation for 
                                                          
12
 The country-level variation in the proportion of the Cohesion Funds from the total EU funds was low within the 
two country groups. For the eligible Southern countries the share of CF from the total funds ranged between 19 and 
30 percent in 2000-06 and between 10 and 18 percent in 2007-13, while in the case of the Eastern periphery this 
figure varied between 53 and 65 percent in 2000-06 and between 33 and 36 percent in 2007-13.  In 2014-20, the 
share of Cohesion Fund from the total EU funds is the lowest in Hungary (23 percent) and the highest in Bulgaria (33 
percent) among the Eastern members.  
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research and development reveals a counterintuitive pattern: the better a country’s position, the 
higher share of EU funds it allocates for R&D projects.  
  
Table 2: The association between development needs and spending strategies 
 
2007-2013 2014-2020 
Physical infrastructure + 
 
(τ = .456, p < 0.05) 
+ 
 
(τ = .651, p < 0.01) 
Research and development -  
 
(τ = -.449, p < 0.05) 
-  
 
(τ = -.449, p < 0.05) 
Human capital 
0 
 
(τ = .049, p > 0.1) 
0  
 
(τ = -.059, p > 0.1) 
Business support 0  
 
(τ = .243, p > 0.1) 
0  
 
(τ = .202, p > 0.1) 
Institution building +  
 
(τ = .502, p < 0.05) 
+  
 
(τ = .495, p < 0.05) 
 
 
These simple tests of association do not explain why there is mixed evidence about the 
developmental impact of the EU funds across the member states. Nevertheless, they do suggest 
that spending strategies in the Eastern and the Southern periphery do not correspond to the 
domestic development needs. On the one hand, the dominance of physical infrastructure spending 
may be attributed to the fact that these investments are the most expensive ones. National 
governments thus prefer to dedicate the EU’s resources to such projects instead of burdening the 
state budgets especially when fiscal discipline and tightening budgetary controls have become the 
dominant issues on the EU’s current agenda. On the other hand, the completion of large 
infrastructural investments typically in the transport sector may yield immediate political gains 
for the governments because of their visibility and presumed popularity. These projects, however, 
may not contribute to economic growth in the long run precisely because of their adverse effects 
discussed earlier. 
 
Finally, it also needs to be assessed whether total EU funds per capita are proportional to the 
overall (or absolute) development needs of the Eastern and Southern member states. Because 
some member states face challenges in nearly every dimension, they may receive proportionally 
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more funds than those that enjoy a more favourable position. At the same time, low levels of 
development are also associated with low fund absorption capacity which implies that pouring 
money into the poorer member states may not improve their situation. The EU thus needs to 
strike a balance between minimizing the wasting of funds and maximizing their potential 
contribution to development. 
 
In order to address the above question, the overall development need of the Southern and the 
Eastern member states were calculated by adding up their ranking scores on each spending 
category. This created a scale ranging from 15 to 225, where high scores indicate that the 
performance of the member state is low in nearly every aspect whereas a low value represents a 
good overall position relative to the others. These scores were then plotted against total EU funds 
per capita allocated to each member state in 2007-13 and 2014-20.  
 
Based on the results displayed in Figure 2, the Southern and the Eastern member states 
demonstrate two distinct patterns. While per capita funds are rather proportional to the overall 
development needs of the Southern countries, in the case of the East the two variables suggest a 
negative relationship. This is mostly because Bulgaria and Romania, the two EU members facing 
the greatest development challenges, received the lowest per capita support in the Eastern 
periphery in both periods. On the one hand, the reason for this was the substantial delay in 
creating their domestic institutional background for fund administration. In fact, the European 
Commission decided to temporarily suspend the payments to the two countries because of grave 
irregularities in fund management and implementation (Spendzharova and Vachudova 2012). On 
the other hand, the low per capita EU support can also be explained by the anticipated low 
absorption capacity of these countries which, in turn, is a consequence of their level of 
backwardness.  
 
Nevertheless, Figure 2 suggests that the EU allocated more funds to those Eastern members that 
demonstrated better overall performance relative to the others, while the Southern countries 
received support rather proportional to their development needs. The reason for the diverse 
approaches may reflect the EU’s concerns about the Eastern members’ fund absorption capacity ( 
Grabbe 2001; Bachtler and McMaster 2007; Ferry and McMaster 2013). It may be the case that 
the EU’s priority was to maximize the absorption of funds and increase efficiency of spending 
(Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon 2004a). In the Eastern members the EU even encouraged the 
strengthening of the central administrations at the expense of creating sub-national administrative 
capacities for fund management (Bruszt 2008), but expectations about low fund absorption in the 
East did not materialize. In fact, both a qualitative (Bachtler, Mendez, and Oraže 2014) and a 
quantitative (Tosun 2014) analysis have shown that absorption rates in the Eastern members were 
higher than anticipated.  
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Figure 2: Overall development need (2006 and 2013) and total per capita EU funds 
(2007-2013 and 2014-2020) 
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source: the author’s own calculation based on European Commission (2007) and Eurostat and WGI data 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The economic crisis in 2007-08 exposed the governments of the EU’s Southern and Eastern 
periphery to shrinking state revenues, rising deficits and debt and a sharp fall in economic output. 
As these countries have traditionally been the greatest beneficiaries of the EU’s cohesion policy, 
the funds allocated to them served as an important instrument to tackle these challenges. In these 
circumstances, the need to invest the EU funds in growth-generating projects gained even greater 
salience than before. To put it differently, the spending preferences of the national governments 
became a key issue in the post-crisis setting. 
 
In line with this, the paper has sought to explore the spending strategies of the two peripheries. It 
highlighted how the national governments allocated the EU funds across five main spending 
categories in the last and the current programming cycles and, at the same time, it also 
investigated whether those spending preferences were in line with their domestic development 
needs. With this inquiry the paper aimed to contribute to the cohesion policy literature from a 
novel aspect: while past research has mostly concentrated on the determinants and consequences 
of fund absorption and implementation and how the policy shaped domestic state administration, 
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the spending preferences of the member states have not been put under scrutiny. This is puzzling 
because the allocation of the funds to specific spending categories strikes the balance between 
domestic development objectives and may also influence the growth-generating effects of the 
funds.  
 
The paper has found that both the Southern and the Eastern members have prioritized 
investments into physical infrastructure over other projects. In each observed period this 
spending category gained the largest – although declining – share from the EU funds even though 
the contribution of physical infrastructure investments to long-term economic growth may be 
questionable. In contrast, human capital and R&D projects, which can be considered the two 
most important expenditure categories for future growth prospects, received less support. 
 
The paper has also revealed that spending preferences were not entirely in line with domestic 
development needs. In the case of human capital and business support projects, there was no 
relationship between the share of funds and the measure of development need, while the analysis 
found an inverse association in the case of R&D projects. Only the share of EU funds devoted to 
physical infrastructure and institution building seemed to correspond to domestic development 
needs. These findings confirm the bias in fund allocation towards physical investments. Finally, 
with respect to total funds per capita, the paper has found that while the Southern members 
received assistance proportional to their overall development need, a reverse relationship 
characterized the case of the Eastern countries.  
 
The findings presented here supply some evidence for those studies that criticize the cohesion 
policy because of its ambiguous performance in generating economic growth in the peripheral 
EU members. Investing predominantly in physical infrastructure involves lower long-term 
growth prospects than financing human capital and R&D projects, regardless of domestic 
absorption capacity and institutional quality. In this respect, the spending strategies of the 
peripheral member states suggest that they tend to misallocate the EU funds.  
 
However, the empirical findings presented here raise some important questions that future 
research may address. First, the motivations for why national governments both in the South and 
the East kept prioritizing physical infrastructure investments over other projects with greater 
growth potentials needs to be explored. Second, the role of the EU in shaping domestic spending 
preferences also has to be clarified. All things considered, the misallocation of the funds is 
certainly not responsible for the lack of convergence between the EU core and periphery. 
However, the findings do suggest that by placing more emphasis on human capital and R&D 
projects instead of physical investments, the cohesion policy funds may contribute to long-term 
economic growth more than they currently do. 
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Appendix 1: Shares of EU funds across the main spending categories by member states 
2000-06 shares (%) from total allocation 
 
R&D and ICT Human capital 
Business 
support 
Physical 
infrastructure 
Institution 
building and 
technical 
assistance 
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Czech Republic 5,31 3,52 10,20 77,90 3,06 
Estonia 6,75 12,42 6,52 70,97 3,33 
Ireland 12,29 0,00 3,03 76,69 5,39 
Greece 9,55 8,26 10,25 67,64 2,53 
Spain 8,66 5,42 10,45 75,28 0,19 
Italy 10,44 1,97 37,52 47,68 2,39 
Latvia 4,07 3,18 13,31 77,53 1,91 
Lithuania 6,09 7,07 10,24 73,10 3,50 
Hungary 7,03 7,12 11,34 69,60 2,43 
Poland 3,89 2,70 11,69 79,86 1,86 
Portugal 8,34 11,36 22,07 57,05 1,06 
Romania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Slovenia 9,02 0,00 18,15 68,07 4,76 
Slovakia 2,59 1,97 10,27 82,75 2,42 
Mean share 
East 5,59 4,75 11,47 74,97 2,91 
Mean share 
South 9,86 5,40 16,66 64,87 2,31 
      2007-13 shares (%) from total allocation 
 
R&D and ICT Human capital 
Business 
support 
Physical 
infrastructure 
Institution 
building 
Bulgaria 10,86 9,83 11,55 57,48 10,28 
Czech Republic 19,19 11,91 11,16 52,59 5,15 
Estonia 21,51 20,01 11,01 44,87 2,60 
Ireland 25,68 42,64 6,96 23,12 1,60 
Greece 17,21 16,97 14,18 48,57 3,07 
Spain 23,03 7,03 18,99 48,66 2,28 
Italy 27,97 15,78 17,22 34,29 4,74 
Latvia 19,92 17,75 6,24 51,96 4,12 
Lithuania 19,76 17,91 10,21 46,57 5,55 
Hungary 16,92 20,85 7,46 50,32 4,45 
Poland 21,71 11,32 9,30 53,12 4,55 
Portugal 24,51 33,12 7,57 28,77 6,04 
Romania 11,84 11,67 12,23 58,95 5,32 
Slovenia 26,69 11,14 11,09 48,29 2,79 
Slovakia 20,99 15,88 9,18 50,08 3,87 
Mean share 18,94 14,83 9,94 51,42 4,87 
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East 
Mean share 
South 23,68 23,11 12,98 36,68 3,55 
      2014-20 shares (%) from total allocation 
 
R&D and ICT Human capital 
Business 
support 
Physical 
infrastructure 
Institution 
building 
Bulgaria 7,12 16,67 15,07 53,18 7,96 
Czech Republic 15,94 17,93 10,09 51,23 4,81 
Estonia 20,57 22,66 19,68 30,63 6,46 
Ireland 22,80 31,68 30,95 13,08 1,48 
Greece 11,38 14,33 18,88 49,55 5,86 
Spain 23,78 17,76 23,95 31,38 3,13 
Italy 16,70 23,84 24,62 28,17 6,67 
Latvia 14,59 21,29 9,83 51,57 2,72 
Lithuania 13,82 17,97 18,40 44,37 5,45 
Hungary 14,06 17,75 26,22 37,63 4,35 
Poland 17,12 12,24 14,30 52,64 3,69 
Portugal 12,39 30,63 30,27 22,48 4,23 
Romania 6,71 14,59 10,74 61,68 6,28 
Slovenia 17,66 14,96 27,10 34,22 6,05 
Slovakia 19,01 14,54 11,19 49,33 5,93 
Mean share 
East 14,66 17,06 16,26 46,65 5,37 
Mean share 
South 17,41 23,65 25,73 28,93 4,27 
Source: the author’s own calculation 
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Appendix 2: Per capita EU funds on the main spending categories by countries 
2000-2006 per capita allocation in EUR (pop. data: 1999) 
 
R&D and ICT Human capital 
Business 
support 
Physical 
infrastructure 
Institution 
building and 
technical 
assistance 
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Czech Republic 10,72 7,11 20,57 157,14 6,17 
Estonia 32,47 59,75 31,37 341,36 16,02 
Ireland 83,40 0,00 30,60 520,28 36,59 
Greece 164,10 141,90 196,48 1161,79 43,49 
Spain 87,13 54,48 105,09 757,07 1,94 
Italy 34,20 6,45 122,88 156,16 7,84 
Latvia 18,49 14,45 60,43 351,99 8,66 
Lithuania 24,28 28,18 40,84 291,45 13,93 
Hungary 18,64 18,88 36,43 184,50 6,45 
Poland 10,56 7,34 31,75 216,96 5,05 
Portugal 135,52 184,51 358,58 926,94 17,23 
Romania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Slovenia 17,82 0,00 35,87 134,48 9,40 
Slovakia 6,57 5,01 26,07 210,06 6,14 
East 17,44 17,59 35,42 235,99 8,98 
South 100,87 77,47 162,73 704,45 21,42 
      2007-2013 per capita allocation in EUR (pop. data: 2006) 
 
R&D and ICT Human capital 
Business 
support 
Physical 
infrastructure 
Institution 
building 
Bulgaria 95,68 86,62 101,77 506,59 90,62 
Czech Republic 492,12 305,62 286,30 1348,93 132,08 
Estonia 545,01 507,05 279,06 1137,12 65,85 
Ireland 44,37 73,69 12,02 39,96 2,77 
Greece 311,85 307,47 257,00 880,22 55,62 
Spain 177,11 54,08 146,04 374,12 17,56 
Italy 134,35 75,80 82,70 164,68 22,78 
Latvia 409,00 364,47 128,12 1066,64 84,63 
Lithuania 412,03 373,39 212,90 970,84 115,62 
Hungary 418,81 516,22 184,59 1245,86 110,25 
Poland 371,31 193,56 159,10 908,61 77,88 
Portugal 498,64 673,81 153,98 585,25 122,87 
Romania 100,78 99,32 104,16 501,87 45,27 
Slovenia 544,53 227,19 226,26 985,11 56,86 
Slovakia 443,80 335,72 194,05 1058,93 81,82 
East 383,31 300,92 187,63 973,05 86,09 
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South 233,26 236,97 130,35 408,85 44,32 
       
2014-2020 per capita allocation in EUR (pop. data: 2013) 
 
R&D and ICT Human capital 
Business 
support 
Physical 
infrastructure 
Institution 
building 
Bulgaria 67,02 156,98 141,93 500,79 74,98 
Czech Republic 327,77 368,73 207,54 1053,80 98,97 
Estonia 550,60 606,74 527,02 819,97 173,01 
Ireland 47,27 65,67 64,15 27,12 3,07 
Greece 156,58 197,14 259,67 681,51 80,60 
Spain 137,42 102,63 138,39 181,28 18,06 
Italy 87,09 124,28 128,37 146,87 34,77 
Latvia 316,38 461,75 213,26 1118,40 58,99 
Lithuania 310,55 403,68 413,34 996,96 122,38 
Hungary 286,42 361,73 534,21 766,69 88,64 
Poland 341,62 244,30 285,33 1050,30 73,68 
Portugal 250,18 618,64 611,41 454,05 85,47 
Romania 75,19 163,53 120,36 691,19 70,35 
Slovenia 257,55 218,24 395,28 499,15 88,23 
Slovakia 481,13 368,15 283,31 1248,56 150,09 
East 301,42 335,38 312,16 874,58 99,93 
South 135,71 221,67 240,40 298,17 44,39 
 
Source: the author’s own calculation 
